The Uneasy Alliances of 1641-53

by Bryn Coldrick, B.A.,P.g.Cert.




In December 1649, members of the Irish Catholic clergy met at Clonmacnoise to call for unity and to condemn the divisions between the royalist groups which were losing their fight against Cromwell's parliamentary force, as it steamrolled across the country, picking off one garrison after another. The terrible massacres at Drogheda and Wexford were fresh in their minds, and they were convinced that Cromwell was intending to root out Catholicism by recolonizing the country with Protestants. If the mutual hatred and suspicion between either provinces or families, or between Old English and Old Irish or any of the English or Scotch adhering to His Majesty (1) could not be swept aside quickly, the English Parliament would soon crush its opponents in Ireland. All that could save them now was unity.

This essay aims to examine why this desperate appeal for solidarity became necessary and looks at the effects which the divisions between the royalist groups in Ireland had on their war effort. It also examines what Parliament was fighting for: was this simply an ideological war, and if so, was the ideological unity of Cromwell's troops in Ireland the secret of his success here? Or are there other factors which must be taken into account? The conclusion is that ideological motives were secondary to conquest and greed, and that it was miliatry skill and superior resources which triumphed over disunity.

With hindsight, it seems somewhat hypocritical of the Irish clergy to call for unity in Ireland against the English onslaught, especially when one considers their behaviour over the previous three or four years. In the autumn of 1645, Pope Innocent X sent Rinuccini to Ireland to restore and re-establish the public exercise of the Catholic religion in the island of Ireland (2). While this was one of the aims of the two groups in the 'Confederation of Kilkenny', it was the single goal of the papal nuncio, and as far as he was concerned, everything else was subordinate to it. He proceeded to turn the war into an unwinnable one of religion, and the treaty which he had drawn up with the Earl of Glamorgan in December 1645 had seemed to guarantee him all I thought necessary for the security of religion (3). But this treaty had been repudiated by Charles I once the English Parliament found out about it. The King however was still desperate for the 10,000 Irish troops offered by the Confederation to aid him in his Civil War against his Parliament, and he ordered his Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, the Marquis of Ormond, to reach another agreement with them, which he did the following March. Rinuccini however, refused to accept this 'Ormond Peace' on the grounds that it made no mention . . . of the Catholic religion, and the security thereof (4). Brendan Fitzpatrick has said that this statement "defies comprehension" (5) since the Peace, among other things, promised the repeal of all anti-Catholic laws and the admission of Catholics into future Parliaments. However, as Richard Bagwell has pointed out, the implementation of these concessions would be left in the hands of Protestants, and Rinuccini argued that the 'Oath of Association' had been taken by the 'rebels' to free Catholics of Protestant domination, and that this was the only way to genuinely secure their religion (6). As far as the nuncio was concerned, the 'Ormond Peace' was an empty promise by a Protestant king whose word was worthless (7) and he excommunicated its adherents. This caused a crisis in the Confederation, since it forced the two separate groups within it to ask themselves where their loyalties really lay — with the English king, or the Pope in Rome?

The Confederation of Kilkenny had been an uneasy alliance from the very start. While the Old English were genuine royalists, the Gaelic Irish "cared extremely little for the Crown and a great deal for the Church" (8). The Old English were the traditional enforcers of English power in Ireland, but by the 1640s were being rapidly eclipsed by the New English elite. Old English adherence to Catholicism had caused their Protestant rivals to suspect their loyalty, and it was this distrust, together with the New English anxiousness to replace them in their privileged postion in Ireland, which had forced the Old English to join the Gaelic Irish in rebellion. They were fighting for their religion certainly, but perhaps more importantly they were struggling for a return to the pre-war status quo. As Lord Castlehaven put it, we hope in time, the storm being passed, to return to our old government under the King (9), and the Old English were an integral part of that old governemnt. The Old English therefore were fighting to hold onto their postion of influence in Ireland. The Gaelic Irish, however, had lost theirs long ago. After the 'Battle of Benburb' in June 1646, when Owen Roe O' Neill's Ulster Army destroyed the Scots under Monroe, he reminded his troops that they were the ancient inhabitants of Ulster, professing the same faith as those who first brought Chistianity into Ireland (10). They were also trying to win back land and influence lost during the plantations which came in the wake of the 'Nine Years War' and the 'Flight of the Earls'. They were not nationalists in the modern sense of the word, fighting for a separate, autonomous Ireland, though some at the time, including their Old English allies, thought they were. Matters were not helped by Conor O' Mahony's call for the election of a Gaelic king of Ireland (11) and the gift which Massari brought back from Rome for Owen Roe — Hugh O' Neill's sword (12).

The Gaelic Irish and the Old English, both wanting to re-assert their former influence, quickly lost the semblance of unity in the Confederation, which because of their experience of parliamentary procedure, became dominated by the latter very early on. By 1646, the Gaelic Irish, despite pledging nominal allegiance to the English Crown, proved themselves more inclined to favour Rome. It was they, the majority of the native population, along with the Old English of the towns (who had no land to worry about anyway) who backed the papal nuncio against the Ormond Peace, while the Old English notables continued to throw their weight behind the King. In September 1646, the nuncio demanded that Charles fully recognise Catholicism or else he would attack Dublin. Ormond was forced to consider handing the capital over to Parliament, which he eventually did the following June. Meanwhile, Rinuccini, emboldened by the support of O'Neill and the Gaelic Irish, arrested those members of the Confederation's Supreme Council who were responsible for the Ormond Peace, and had them thrown in prison. He then declared himself the President of a new Supreme Coucil and had a new Oath of Association drawn up which insisted that the free practice of Catholicism be a primary aim of the Confederation, along with the security of churches and church land.

Further tension arose in the summer of 1648 when the confederates signed a truce with the Munster leader, Lord Inchiquin, who had destroyed the Confederate Army in the province a mere six months earlier. Inchiquin, who represented the Protestant interest in Munster, had recently turned his back on Parliament and declared for the King. The main reasons behind his defection were the lack of support he was receiving from Parliament for his campaign on their behalf, and his hatred for the rising 'Independent Party'. When Lord Lisle had been sent over to Ireland, Inchiquin had found himself being accused of mismanagement and corruption, and his garrisons in Co. Wexford had been replaced by troops from the New Model Army (13). This had led him to the conclusion that the Independents planned to place or displace such as are, or are not, Independents (14). For these reasons he became a royalist and joined Ormond.

The 'Inchiquin Truce' caused two major splits in Ireland. Firstly, his own troops, who were mostly Protestant and Parliamentarian, resented the thought of joining Catholics and Royalists. They saw Inchiquin as a traitor and many of his officers threatened to mutiny. When Cromwell arrived, they did just that. The second consequence of the truce was that it shattered the already fragile unity of the Confederation. When the nuncio excommunicated the supporters of the Truce, Old English and Gaelic Irish finally reached the point of no return. The Supreme Council stripped O'Neill of his commission after he declared his loyalty for Rinuccini, but he defied their orders (15). The Confederation scorned the nuncio for undermining their allegience to the King, accusing him of arbitrary and tyrannical conduct (16), and ordered him not to intermeddle directly or indirectly in Irish affairs anymore (17). In response, Rinuccini accused them of being Catholics only in name (18). The exasperated nuncio left Ireland in February 1649, a month after the signing of the 'Second Ormond Peace' which had been accepted by the General Assembly following the execution of Charles I across the Irish Sea. By now all Catholics in Ireland realised that their only chance of resisting England's victorious parliament, was cooperaion with the Protestant royalists.

However, the divisions caused by the first Ormond Peace and the Inchiquin Truce would not allow the marriage to last long. The new peace simply papered over the cracks which were once more brought to the surface following the rout at Rathmines in August 1649 (19). Inchiquin, who asked to join the royalists, refused to allow his men to serve under Catholic commanders such as Taaffe and Preston. Irish Catholics refused to fight alongside Protestants, and the Protestants looked forward to their opportunity to join the ranks of Parliament. Many of Inchiquin's troops were those who had been brought over with Lord Lisle to crush the rebels, not to join them. This defection of Protestants back to Parliament created a vicious circle: defections caused resentment from the other coalition members, and the greater this resentment, the more men who were driven to defect! (20)


Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector

Crowmell was not fooled by the clergy's newly-found royalism for one minute. He scoffed at the 'Clonamcnoise Decrees' as being a mere fig-leaf of pretence (21) The decress themselves, rather than strengthening the unity among the different royalist factions, actually widen the gulf further by emphasising Catholic unity and so alienated the Protestants even more (22). The clergy's lack of genuine commitment to solidarity is demonstrated by their call for Ormond to oust Inchiquin from the alliance in March 1650 and their refusal to allow Ormond to enter vitally-strategic towns, such as Limerick, when he desperately needed to. Nationality only exacerbated the problem: Christopher Hill writes that the Gaelic Irish were "hostile to all Englishmen" (23) and after the Battle of Rathmines, many of the English troops in Ormond's and Inchiquin's armies rushed to join their compatriots under Col. Michael Jones, and later under Oliver Cromwell himself.
After 500 English soldiers joined Parliament at New Ross, "Inchiquin's once formidable army practically ceased to exist" (24) and Ian Gentles argues that without such defections away from the royalist camp, Cromwell would have had no troops left in Ireland by the end of 1649 (25). When Lord Broghill called on Inchiquin's officers to join Parliament, they and their men rejoiced that they were re-joining their fellow countrymen, and simply handed over five of Munster's most important garrisons to Cromwell (26). The third nationality in Ireland at the time was the Scots, who had joined Ormond after the Second English Civil War and the execution of the King. However, their contribution to the war became insignificant after the Battle of Benburb when O'Neill routed them (27).

The royalist / Confederate war effort had been suffering badly from these divisions over the last few years, long before Cromwell ever arrived on the scene. When Rinuccini had sent Preston and O'Neill to attack Dublin in late 1646, he had to come up himself to stop them fighting each other, and he lamented that arms at first devoted to religion were about to minister to private passions alone (28). By late 1648, the Ulster and Leinster armies were openly fighting each other, as the Gaelic Irish devoured the province which was the traditional homeland of Old English families like the Prestons.

After four successful months in Ireland, Cromwell's effective numbers dropped from 12,000 to a mere 3,000. The ravages of disease, casulaties, and the need to leave troops behind to defend captured garrisons, all took their toll. In December 1649, he wrote to tell Parliament that a considerable part of your army is fitter for a hospital than the field (29). Ormond was in the area at the time with vastly superior numbers, but the divisions between the royalists, and their lack of morale, prevented him from risking an open assault. Instead he had been forced to fall back into the towns, but these were mostly full of Rinuccini supporters, and were suspicious of Protestant or English commanders, and often refused to cooperate: Drogheda was not fully behind Aston; Wexford refused to admit the Englishman, Castlehaven; and the obstruction of Ormond by the townspeople of Limerick inhibited his activities in the east of the country. The Lord Lieutenant blamed the clergy for this lack of cooperation and told them that the spring of our past losses and approaching ruin arises from disobedience (30).

Unlike Ormond, who had the greatest difficulty in the world (31) to keep opposing religions, nationalities and political allegiences together, Cromwell had the luxury of leading a single, English, Protestant and Parliamentarian force, whose only goals in Ireland were that of suppession and conquest. His reply to the Clonmacnoise Decrees sums up his motives for invasion:

We are come to ask an account of the innocent blood that has been shed . . . . We come to break the power of a company of lawless rebels . . . . We come ( by the assistance of God ) to hold forth and maintain the lustre and glory of English liberty in a nation where we have an undoubted right to do it. (32)

In these lines, he reflected the hopes and opinions of most Englishmen at that time. The Irish Catholics, led by their clergy, had been responsible for the most unheard-of and most barbarous massacre ( without respect of sex or age ) that ever the sun beheld, he said (33), and this claim was almost universally accepted in England. After the massacre at Drogheda, Cromwell described what had happened as a righteous judgement of God upon these barbarous wretches who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood (34). The second main motive for the conquest was the security of England.

Cromwell had a number of problems to deal with when he became the chairman of the 'Council of State' in February 1649, but as he said himself, Ireland was the most dangerous (35). Ireland was the most likely springboard for the restoration of Charles II and the execution of his father had heightened the possibility of a continental invasion, especially since so many German troops had recently been made redundant (36), and Ireland had long been feared by the English as the back door for foreign attack. The best way to neutralise the threat posed by Ireland, and indeed Scotland, was to turn them into "little Englands" (37). After the Wexford massacre, one Parliamentary leader remarked that it were to be wished that an honest people would come and plant here (38). Cromwell's utopian vision for Ireland was to substitue a godly society for a degenerate popish one. Godly Protestant landowners would replace 'these barbarous wretches' and ensure that Ireland would never again pose a "threat to Protestant and English interest" (39). He also believed that an iminent millenium necessitated such a godly reformation, and that in Ireland he was on a mission from God. He was frank with the Catholic clergy and told them that you are part of Antichrist whose kingdom the Scripture so expressly speaks should be laid in blood (40).

The degree to which we can call this an 'ideological war' is, however, debateable I think. Rooting out popery and replacing it with a godly people is an ideological motive, but there was also an economic motive for the conquest of Ireland which was just as pressing, if not moreso. After the capture of New Ross, Cromwell wrote back to Parliament to say that I hope, before it be long, to see Ireland no burden to England, but a profitable part of its Commonwealth (41). Christopher Hill argues that the "racial contempt for the Irish" was no more than a justification for Parliament's desire to exploit the natives of a land in which they had an undoubted right to do it (42). Ian Gentles points out that since a total of £3M was owed to the army, which was an important prop of the Independent Party, and to creditors, "Parliament needed every acre of Irish land it could lay its hands on" (43). The conquest and colonisation of Ireland was simply "a business operation" (44) and the main achievement after the war was not the suppression of Catholicism and the introduction of a new godly society, but the almost complete transfer of land ownership from Catholics to Protestants. Although the Commissioners' main task had ostensibly been the suppression of idolatry, popery, superstition and prophaneness (45), Catholics were allowed to stay on as labourers and tenants to their new landlords, and as anti-Catholic persecution gradually became more and more relaxed, little real effort was put into converting Catholics to Protestantism.

The main ideology of the New Model Army was the protection of the fundamental rights of freeborn Englishmen (46). Although it was known for its harmonious heterodoxy, rather than religious homogenity, its pathological hatred of Catholicism seems certain. It saw the Irish expedition as a "crusade to establish reformed religion in the last British stronghold of popery" (47) and, as Cromwell told his troops before they left Bristol, they were the Israelites, about to extirpate the idolatrous inhabitants of Canaan (48). Those radicals who had opposed the Irish expedition had been silenced by the suppression of the Burford Mutiny. Besides, it was not so much the principle of the project that they had objected to, as the failure to address the other grievances of the Army (49). However, not all looked forward to going to Ireland; indeed it was known by some as the 'cut-throat expedition' and many had to be forced to go. Despite this, the New Model Army "enjoyed higher morale than most armies in the seventeenth century" (50). There are a number of reasons for this, not simply 'ideological homogenity'. First of all, most of the troops believed that they were serving in an army which was an "almost passive instrument in the hands of the Almighty" (51) and military success bolstered this belief. However, some officers such as Col. John Jones were disturbed by an atheistic element which existed in the ranks (52). Another boost to morale was the egalitarianism in the NMA, which was expressed by the willingness of its officers to share the dangers and hardships of war with their men. Finally, there was the Army's glittering military record, which was enough to boost the morale of any army. Naturally, it dropped when things were not going so well. In Ireland, bad weather, disease, shortages, and unexpectedly stubborn resistence, led to rumblings of mutiny, and even refusals to charge when ordered, as happened at Kilkenny. Their excuse was that they were not used to being thus repulsed (53). The most important factor to consider when trying to explain the success of the New Model Army in Ireland, other than the discord which crippled its enemies, was Cromwell's absolute insistence that it be well provided for. This, in my opinion, is the main reason why he like a lightning passed through the land (54). In April 1650, Crowmell warned Parliament in a letter that if moneys be not supplied, we shall not be able to carry on your work (55). Before he had accepted the command of the Irish expedition, he had insisted that his troops be well satisfied concerning a just and fitting provision for them (56). During his whole campaign in Ireland, he was continually sent supplies from England, and this was not only a preservative of morale and effectiveness, it was also a major attraction to those who were considering defection to the Parliamentary ranks. Lord Inchiquin had been aware of this danger as early as May 1648 when he wrote to Ormond in desperation that

diverse of my men have died of hunger, after they had for a while lived on cats and dogs, as many do now. And if, while I am in this condition, the Parliament shipping should arrive according to our expectation . . . with some officers, money, clothes, and victuals, and make tender to our soldiers . . . a greater strait than I shall be in, cannot be imagined (57).

Later on, Ormond himself admitted that he feared Crowmell's money more than his reputation, which was leaving coalition members so stupified that it is with great difficulty that I can persuade them to do something like men toward their own preservation (58). Money, or rather the lack of it, was making an already difficult task impossible. In the early 1650s, while Parliament's forces were still being supplied, famine and disease was gripping the country, and in May 1652, the people of Kilkenny were even forced to eat their own plough horses (59). Is it any wonder that morale amoungst Crowmell's opponents fell so low? Also, his initial ability to keep his army abundantly supplied meant that Cromwell's troops did not need to pillage the countryside for food. Ormond and O'Neill on the other hand, were forced to do exactly that, and turned the populace against them in the process.

There had been an increasingly direct link between money and military success throughout the war, and it applied to all sides. The money which Rinuccini brought over from Rome had been a huge boost to the Catholic war effort, and O'Neill's ability to offer his troops regular pay for the first time was rewarded by the anihilation of the Scottish army at Benburb (60). However, subsequent lack of funding and supplies contributed directly to Preston's defeat at Dungan's Hill, and O'Neill's inability to prevent Col. Michael Jones clearing north Leinster. During the English Civil Wars, Parliament's forces in Ireland had been neglected, and hungry unpaid troops simply handed over Drogheda and Dundalk shortly before the arrival of Cromwell. Later, Ormond's inability to supply the garrison at Clonmel made its surrender almost inevitable. In August 1650, he was told by the clergy that there was no money or arms left, while Cromwell's forces were "drawing large contributions from Irish Catholics whose country was in their hands" (61).

Finally we must examine the purely military reasons for Parliament's successful conquest of Ireland. Divisions between his enemies were not the only factor, since O'Neill's Gaelic Irish were well able to destroy the Scots single-handedly, a fact that Rinuccini took great delight in (62). This was, however, the last major Confederate or Royalist victory in Ireland, since the changing situation in England had sounded the death-knell for all Parliament's enemies, at home and abroad. The superior quality of the recently reinforced army under Jones, together with the departure of Lord Inchiquin's men to defend Munster, cost Ormond's coalition the Battle of Rathmines, and it never fully recovered from this defeat. Also, Cromwell's celebrated military skill completely out-classed the inexperienced and mediocre Lord Lieutenant. The best Irish general, Owen Roe O'Neill, remained detatched from the coalition because of bickering rivalries until it was too late. He died in Novemeber 1649 and while his successor, the Bishop of Clogher, may have been well respected by his troops, it was not for his military prowess, and in the following summer the Ulster Army was completely destroyed at the Battle of Scarrifhollis. No doubt, the bishop's dismassal of all Englishmen from the army had not increased his chances of success, but it was mainly inexperience which led to the disaster. The defeat, in turn, so deflated morale in Carlow and Waterford, that it contributed to the surrenders there also.

Crowmell had a "vast numerical advantage" over the defenders of Drogheda and Wexford (63) as well as 23 modern artillery pieces. His severity at these towns was intended to prevent the effusion of blood for the future (64), which to a larger extent, it did. The garrisons defending Dundalk and Trim simply walked away, and although Waterford and Clonmel offered spirited resistance, in the end Ormond's coalition "could not fight demoralisation" (65). While sucking away the last drops of morale from his opponents, Cromwell's almost unboken series of victories in Ireland helped boost recruitment for the expedition, and reduced the war to one of guerrilla tactics and skirmishes, which continued largely without effect into the 1650s, although the 'Kilkenny Articles' had formally ended the war in May 1652.

In conclusion, it may be said that Cromwell's task in Ireland was made much easier by the mutual suspicions, resentments, and cross-purposes among the various groups he had come to put down. It was not however, a purely ideological war on his part, or indeed, one of religion. There were other, less lofty motives behind the vicious suppression of the rebels and royalists, and ideological intentions such as the eradication of popery and the spreading of the Gospel, were never completed or even pursued in earnest. Nor did a fromal Act of Union ever make it through the House (66). All that really mattered was the transfer of land ownership from Catholics to Protestants which would guarantee security in the future, and pay off Parliament's debts. And although the New Model Army was certainly unified in Ireland, whose nationality and rabid hatred of rebellious Irish Catholics proved a valuable weapon in the hands of its leaders, the secret of its success was its life-line from England. The NMA enjoyed the relative comfort of regular supplies and a level of morale so lacking in the various groups which Ormond was trying desperately to coordinate. Unity did exist in the ranks of the New Model Army in Ireland, and we could even go so far as to label it 'ideological homogenity', but it was money, such an important motive for their presence here, that was the decisive factor in their success.